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Abstract 
This thesis presents a literature review on the empirical studies which have been conducted in the field 
of subjective performance evaluation. As subjective performance evaluation is a broad field of study 
this work focuses on the determinants of the use and the effects of discretionary assessments. The 
theoretical background, the underlying hypotheses and the findings are presented based on the works 
of several authors. When there are multiple empirical results for the same hypothesis, the findings are 
compared to each other. On the one hand, coherent results validate the underlying assumptions so that 
general implications for the use and the effects of subjective performance evaluation can be derived. 
Contradictory findings, on the other hand, show that the hypothesis might be flawed and that, 
depending on the research setting and the sample, different results can be obtained. 
 
 
Diese Diplomarbeit ist eine Literaturübersicht der bisherigen empirischen Studien zu dem Thema 
subjektive Entlohnung. Da das Themengebiet der subjektiven Leistungsbewertung sehr weit gefasst 
ist, konzentriert sich die vorliegende Arbeit auf die Anwendungen und Auswirkungen der subjektiven 
Entlohnung. Basierend auf den Werken diverser Autoren werden der theoretische Hintergrund, die zu 
Grunde liegenden Hypothesen und die Forschungsergebnisse präsentiert. Wenn für eine Hypothese 
mehrere empirische Resultate vorliegen, werden die Ergebnisse miteinander verglichen. Auf der einen 
Seite bestätigen übereinstimmende Forschungsergebnisse die Hypothesen. Daher können allgemein 
gültige Schlussfolgerungen über die Anwendung und die Auswirkungen von subjektiver 
Leistungsbewertung getroffen werden. Auf der anderen Seite, zeigen widersprüchliche Resultate, dass 
die Hypothesen möglicherweise fehlerhaft sind und dass, je nach dem Aufbau der Studie und der 
verwendeten Daten, verschiedene Ergebnisse erzielt werden. 
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1. Introduction 
The whole concept of performance evaluation is based on the notion that the principal has to offer a 
compensation to get an agent to work. To determine the right amount of payment, the principal needs 
to evaluate the work of the agent. This assessment and the consequential remuneration can be derived 
from objective, formula-based contracts. Objective numbers are widely used because they are fairly 
easy to measure once the compensation contract is set up. However, objective evaluation has its 
pitfalls. 
Research shows that performance measures are poor if they are “(a) not sensitive to manager actions, 
(b) not congruent with organizational objectives, (c) noisy, (d) incomplete, (e) not verifiable, and (f) 
manipulable.”1 Objective measures can be all that. The more deficient they are, the more sense it 
makes to evaluate the agent’s actions subjectively. In fact, Baker, Jensen, and Murphy state that the 
“performance in most jobs cannot be measured objectively because joint production and 
unobservability mean that individual output is not readily quantifiable.”2 
The notion of using subjective performance evaluation seems to be odd at first glance. Several authors 
have shown that subjectivity is an important component of incentive contracts.3 The subjective 
bonuses, which are also called discretionary, are crucial elements of implicit compensation contracts. 
Subjectivity also plays a major role when it comes to “promotions, job assignments and the threat of 
termination.”4 
The above shows that the field of subjective performance evaluation is important in practice as 
objective assessments are prone to errors. Up until now, various authors have dealt with the topic. This 
thesis gives a literature review on their findings and focuses on the empirical studies which examine 
the use and the effects of subjective performance evaluation. The theoretical background, the 
hypotheses and the empirical results are presented and discussed. Findings which are based on the 
same hypothesis are compared. Coinciding as well as conflicting deliverables are looked at in detail to 
find common implications for the use and the effects of subjective performance evaluation. 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. In section 3, I will introduce studies that show 
under which circumstances subjective performance evaluation is used. In section 4, the effects of 
discretionary assessments will be discussed. In section 5, the comparability of the studies and the 
                                                     
1 Woods, 2008, p. 7 
2 Baker, Jensen, & Murphy, 1988, p. 597 
3 Prendergast, 1999 
4 Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, & Vargus, 2004, p. 2 
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findings will be examined, chapter 6 concludes. Before the analysis begins, I will introduce definitions 
of subjective performance evaluation and the context they are used in. 
2. Definition of subjective performance evaluation 
Even though there are many studies dealing with the topic of subjective performance evaluation, there 
is no universally valid definition of subjective assessments. Listed below are some of the definitions 
used by the authors covered in this thesis. 
• Höppe and Moers define subjective evaluation as assessments where the bonus is not based on a 
mathematical formula and the principal can change bonuses by her5 sole discretion.6 
• For Prendergast “a subjective measure is anything that is not verifiable to a third party.”7 
• Gibbs M. , Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus state that discretionary bonuses are determined 
by the principal’s judgement.8 
• Hayes and Schaefer state that subjective performance evaluation is only observable to the 
contracting principal and the agent. 9 
• Chow and Van der Stede define subjective performance measures as “nonfinancial measures that 
are derived from subjective judgment.”10 
• Moers defines subjective performance measures as “superior’s subjective judgments about 
qualitative performance indicators.”11 
• Murphy and Oyer test for the amount of discretion, the ratio between subjective and objective 
assessments. They state that subjective ratings are based on the principal’s ex post assessment of 
performance.12 While objective performance measures are observable and verifiable, and thus 
enforceable in courts, subjective performance measures can only be observed by the principal and 
cannot be verified by third parties.13 
• Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith14 base their study on individual performance measures, as 
opposed to firm-wide financial measures, and assume that the individual evaluation is highly 
subjective. 
                                                     
5 To facilitate the understanding of pronouns the principal will be referred to as she while the agent will be 
   denoted by he. 
6 Höppe & Moers, 2007 
7 Prendergast, 1999, p. 12 
8 Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, & Vargus, 2009 
9 Hayes & Schaefer, 2000 
10 Chow & Van der Stede, 2006, p. 2 
11 Moers, 2005 
12 Murphy & Oyer, 2003 
13 Murphy & Oyer, 2003 
14 Bushman, Indjejikian, & Smith, 1996 
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• Woods says that there are three forms of subjective performance evaluations: “individual 
performance evaluations, discretion in weighting objective performance measures, and paying 
bonuses based on factors other than the objective measures specified in managers’ bonus 
contracts.”15 
Combining all these definitions the following common characteristics stand out. Subjective 
performance evaluation 
• is based on the subjective perception of the principal, 
• is made ex post, 
• is observable only to the contracting principal and agent, 
• cannot be checked by a third party, and 
• is not court enforceable. 
3. Where/when to apply subjective performance evaluation 
During the contract design stage, principal and agent have to agree on how the agent will be 
compensated for his work. The terms of the evaluation process and the performance measures which 
will be used to assess the work of the agent need to be negotiated and identified. 
In general, incentive contracts are divided into a base salary, a formula bonus, and a discretionary 
bonus. The base salary will be given to the agent in any case. The bonuses depend on the performance 
of the employee during a given period of time. “Formula bonuses are based on quantitative 
performance measures”16 while discretionary bonuses depend on the principal’s subjective assessment. 
During their study, Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus17 find out that the distribution 
between the different components of incentive contracts is the following: Base salary accounts for 
49.80%, formula bonus for 36.17%. and discretionary bonus for 4.17%18.19 As shown in the table 
below, 23.14% of all respective managers received a bonus based on subjective performance 
evaluation. 
  
                                                     
15 Woods, 2008, p. 6 
16 Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, & Vargus, 2004, p. 22 
17 Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, & Vargus, 2004 
18 This number includes instances of zero bonuses, for the managers which receive a subjective bonus, the 
average percent of total compensation is 18.01. 
19 The percentage amounts displayed here do not add up to 100%, these are the numbers given by the authors. I    
assume that some kind of rounding error occurred. 
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Table 1: Composition of incentive contracts20 
 Base salary Formula bonus Discretionary bonus 
Percent of managers 
receiving 84.90 66.27 23.14 
Average percent of 
compensation 49.80 36.17 4.17 
 
These findings on the occurrence of subjective performance evaluations are consistent with those of 
prior studies. Gibbs, for example, finds out that in his sample of middle managers 25% received a 
discretionary bonus and that this bonus made up 12% of the total compensation.21  
Subjective performance evaluation is also used for the assessment of CEOs. One example for an 
empirical proof is the study conducted by Hayes and Schaefer who state that “boards of directors use 
information that is not available to those outside the relationship as part of an implicit incentive 
compensation contract”22 for the CEO. Looking at incentive contracts for CEOs, Bushman, 
Indjejikian, and Smith discover that 35% received individual performance bonuses which are believed 
to be discretionary.23 
Chow and Van der Stede24 find that, in their sample of manufacturing managers, financial performance 
measures account for 49%, non-financial for 30% and subjective for 21% of the incentive plan. 
In accordance with these findings, Prendergast states that “most workers are evaluated on subjective 
criteria, where firms choose how to evaluate and how to pay based on those evaluations.”25 
Knowing that the use of subjective performance evaluations is common in practice, it is questionable 
under which circumstances subjectivity will be used. Depending on the prevailing settings of the 
environment, the use of subjective performance measures is preferable over objective measures in 
some cases, while in others it is not. In the following subsections, I will present empirical findings 
which show under which conditions subjective performance evaluations are integrated in 
compensation contracts. 
  
                                                     
20 Based on Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, & Vargus, 2004, p. 22, Table 1 
21 Gibbs, 1995 
22 Hayes & Schaefer, 2000 
23 Bushman, Indjejikian, & Smith, 1996 
24 Chow & Van der Stede, 2006 
25 Prendergast, 1999, p. 11 
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3.1. Mitigation of distortions 
Compensation contracts are used to set incentives for the agent who performs an action for the 
principal. The supervisor wants the employee to act in a way that maximizes the outcome for the 
principal. Thus, incentive contracts should remunerate all dimensions of a job which are important in 
obtaining the optimal outcome for the principal. To achieve goal congruence between the supervisor 
and the employee, all crucial job aspects should be weighted properly according to their importance to 
balance the efforts of the agent.26 
The proper weighting of incentives can be achieved through the right weight allocation of objective 
performance measures. However, this is extremely hard to accomplish due to the fact that objective 
performance measures are commonly based on quantitative accounting numbers which are incomplete. 
Furthermore, it “is difficult to specify all aspects of workers' jobs in an explicit contract.”27 
In most cases, objective performance evaluation is either (1) too narrow or (2) too broad to capture the 
true contribution of the agent to the firm value.28 
1. If objective performance assessments are too narrow, they fail to capture all dimensions which are 
under the control of the agent.29 This means that the agent is not rewarded for all aspects of his 
work. As a consequence, he will not perform these unrewarded actions any longer and will 
concentrate solely on actions which are remunerated. Weather these actions lead to the desired 
goal of the principal, which is to maximize her outcome, is negligible. 
 
2. When objective performance evaluation is too broad, it includes aspects that influence the 
outcome of the agent’s work which are beyond the control of the employee. These uncontrollables 
can be, for example, external influences such as the economic development of the industry or the 
actions of the agent’s colleagues. As the performance measures cannot be controlled by the agent, 
he will not try to exert the highest effort. This will lessen the outcome for the principal. 
In both cases, the agent will not work as hard as he could, which results in a reduction of the 
principal’s profit. This effect is called distorted incentives, since the deployed performance measures 
do not induce the desired behavior but instead lead to unwanted actions.30 In order to avoid distortion, 
the selection of objective performance measures has to be conducted thoroughly and the weighting 
needs to be elaborate. Finding the adequate implementation is almost impossible since objective 
                                                     
26 Holmström, 1979 and Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, & Vargus, 2004 
27 Prendergast, 1999, p. 9 
28 Murphy & Oyer, 2003 
29 Holmström & Milgrom, 1991 
30 Bol, 2008 
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performance measures are mostly expressed in numbers which can only capture certain aspects of a 
job. 
Subjective performance evaluation, which includes the effort the agent exerts or the creativity of his 
actions, can help to mitigate the distortions of objective measures.31 Hayes and Schaefer support this 
notion by stating that implicit contracts, which are prone to subjectivity, will be used if some of the 
agent’s actions cannot be captured through objective performance measures.32 
Based on the concept that performance measures are congruent when the agent’s action to increase the 
measure also augments the principal’s utility, Woods argues that subjective adjustments to objective 
performance measures will be less likely when the objective measure is thought to be congruent.33 The 
empirical analysis of his sample shows that no significant correlation between congurence and the use 
of subjective performance evaluation can be found. Woods explains his findings by stating that the 
ability to fulfill organizational goals cannot be determined by less knowledgeable principals. 
Despite this, similar studies show that other distinct measures of goal congruity do influence the 
occurrence of subjective performance evaluations. In the next sections I will present specific scenarios 
where the use of objective performance measures leads to incentive distortions, which can be 
mitigated by the introduction of subjective performance measures. 
3.1.1. Narrow objective performance measures 
When objective performance measures fail to capture the whole spectrum of actions, some dimensions 
are not rewarded and the agent will focus on the dimensions of the job that are incorporated in the 
compensation contract.34 Being too narrow, these objective measures do not provide strong incentives; 
therefore, distorted incentives are induced. 
Using subjective performance evaluation, the agent’s actions, which cannot be easily captured through 
objective performance measures, can be included in the assessment to create a more holistic picture of 
the employee’s efforts. As a consequence, the agent will not only focus on the objectively measurable 
aspects of his job.35 
In this case, the introduction of subjectivity is beneficial because it mitigates distortions in the 
incentive contract and thus enables better incentives. This effect has been investigated analytically by 
                                                     
31 Bol, 2008 and Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, & Vargus, 2004 
32 Hayes & Schaefer, 2000 
33 Woods, 2008 
34 Holmström & Milgrom, 1991 
35 Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, & Vargus, 2004 
7 
 
Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy36 as well as Budde37 who show that incorporating subjective 
performance measures can improve compensation contracts. 
In their empirical study, Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus follow the same thoughts and 
hypothesize that “the use of subjectivity in the assignment of rewards will be negatively related to 
formula bonus completeness.”38 The completeness of formula bonuses was approximated by the 
number of objective measures used assuming that the more there are, the more complete the objective 
evaluation will be. Trying to find the correlation between formula and discretionary bonuses, the 
authors find that in the absence of a formula bonus, subjective bonuses account for 13% of total 
compensation while they only make up 3% if an objective performance measure is used as well. 
The analysis of their entire sample shows that their measure for formula-based contract completeness 
is not correlated to the use of subjective performance evaluations. When the sample is divided into 
service and sales departments, the regression shows that subjective bonuses in the service departments 
are interrelated with objective bonus completeness. 
Table 2: Completeness and use of subjective performance evaluations39 
Independent variable Discretionary bonuses in all departments 
Discretionary bonuses 
in service 
departments 
Discretionary bonuses 
in sales departments 
Number of formula 
bonuses (measure for 
objective bonus 
completeness) 
no correlation negative correlation* no correlation 
 
* statistical significance at 10% 
Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus argue that jobs in the sales departments include less tasks 
which are difficult to measure objectively. Therefore, the completeness of objective performance 
appraisals is not a problem in the sales departement and, thus, there is no correlation in this case. In the 
service departmens, job aspects like customer satisfaction and the quality of services can hardly be 
evaluated through formula bonuses. Here, objective measures are more incomplete. Following this 
rationale, Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus come to the conclusion that “subjective 
bonuses are used to mitigate formula bonus distortions caused by incompleteness.”40 
                                                     
36 Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 1994 
37 Budde, 2007 
38 Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, & Vargus, 2004, p. 4 
39 Based on Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, & Vargus, 2004, p. 30, Table 5 
40 Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, & Vargus, 2004, p. 14 
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Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus study both, the use and the size of subjective bonuses, to 
determine their influence. After running a Tobit test, they show that the size of the discretionary bonus 
is not related to the number of formula bonuses. 
The context between completeness and the application of subjective performance evaluation is not 
entirely cleared by Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus, therefore, I will introduce other 
authors who investigate the same context. 
Woods argues that the subjective adjustments to objective performance measures are more likely to 
occur when the objective numbers are incomplete.41 His Probit regression shows that this concept is 
valid as the expected negative correlation is proven (-0.393, statistical significance at 1%).42 
Murphy and Oyer43 argue that the mitigation of distortion in objective measures can be reached by 
introducing subjective evaluation or by tying pay to objective market-based measures of shareholder 
value. In this case, market-based measures are an alternative, since stock-based compensation induces 
non-distortionary incentives to increase firm value. Privately held companies do not have market-
based measures of shareholder value, consequentially they rely more heavily on subjective 
performance measures. This leads to the hypothesis that “bonuses will be more discretionary (that is, 
the relative weight on subjective vs. objective performance measures will be higher) in privately held 
companies than in publicly held corporations.“44 
Evaluating their sample of 280 bonus plans, Murphy and Oyer empirically show that the use of 
individual performance appraisals, which are assumed to be largely subjective, is significantly higher 
in privately held firms (75%) than in publicly traded enterprises (62%). Privately held companies, that 
have no objective means to mitigate distortions, use subjective performance evaluation to induce more 
accurate incentives. In fact, bonuses of CEOs in private firms are 11% more often based on subjective 
measures than bonuses of chief executive officers in public enterprises. 
  
                                                     
41 Woods, 2008 
42 Because the hypothesis about completeness is tested in combination with the theory concerning verifiability    
the coefficient is the same. 
43 Murphy & Oyer, 2003 
44 Murphy & Oyer, 2003, p. 10 
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3.1.1.1. Interdependencies 
A special pitfall of objective performance evaluation is that it can hardly display the effects of 
interdependencies in firms. Either it is to narrow and solely focuses on the isolated task of one agent 
which will cause him to maximize his own profit even if other business units are harmed and the 
overall firm value is decreased. Or objective performance measures are set so broad that they capture 
the whole firm, leaving the agent with a lot of uncontrollable influences, such as the actions of the 
other business units. Again, discretionary evaluation, which holds the agent accountable for all his 
actions but not for those of others, is believed to alleviate the problem. The underlying consensus 
exists that the more interdependencies there are the more likely subjective performance evaluation will 
be used. 
Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus argue that “the use of subjectivity in the assignment of 
rewards will be positively related to the extent of organizational interdependencies.”45 In order to 
measure the interdependencies, the authors measure the “percentage of time department managers 
spend interacting with managers in other departments”46, which seems to be a vague approximation to 
capture the networks in a firm. 
Their analysis shows that there is a positive correlation between organizational interdependencies and 
the use of subjective performance measures (0.021, statistical significance at 5%). Gibbs, Merchant, 
Van der Stede, and Vargus interpret this fact in two ways. Firstly, subjective performance measures 
are used to increase and remunerate cooperation between business departments. Secondly, the 
introduction of subjectivity shields agents from the uncontrollable influences of other departments. 
Looking at the determinants for the size of discretionary bonuses they find a positive correlation which 
is very weak and not significant for the total sample. 
The above findings suggest that subjective performance evaluation capture interdependencies better 
than objective performance evaluation, as the individual efforts and the actions undertaken to help or 
harm other units can be detected when performing subjective appraisals. Thus, subjective performance 
measures should be used in enterprises with vertical and horizontal interdependencies, while objective 
measures should be used in firms with relatively autonomous business units. 
Murphy and Oyer47 empirically test this notion by dividing their sample into firms operating in a 
single segment/industry or in multi-segments/industries. Data from the Annual Incentive Plan Design 
Survey 1997 conducted by the consulting firm Towers Perin is used and matched with Compustat 
                                                     
45 Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, & Vargus, 2004, p. 5 
46 Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, & Vargus, 2004, p. 26 
47 Murphy & Oyer, 2003 
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Business Segment files to determine the number of the enterprises’ business segments and industries. 
According to these classifications, the percentage of the executives’ bonuses based on corporate, unit 
and individual performance was determined. Murphy and Oyer presume that individual performance 
appraisals are “subjective assessments of individual performance”48, using them as the equivalent for 
subjective performance evaluation. 
Table 3: Weights of bonuses based on business segments49 
Bonus based on Corporate performance Unit performance 
Individual 
performance 
One business segment 46% 21% 32% 
Multiple business  
segments 35% 41% 24% 
 
Table 4: Weights of bonuses based on industries50 
Bonus based on Corporate performance Unit performance 
Individual 
performance 
One industry 46% 18% 36% 
Multiple industries 38% 36% 25% 
 
The results, which can be seen in Table 1 and Table 2, show that in the presence of one single business 
segment, where the interdependencies between the units are high, individual performance measures 
are more likely to be used (32%) than in the case of multiple business segments (24%). The same 
holds true for the number of industries the firm works in. If the interdependencies are high, because 
the firm is operating in one single industry, the bonus is based on individual performance more often 
(36% compared to 25%). 
These findings prove that executives in firms with high interdependencies receive bonuses that are 
based on individual subjective performance evaluations more often than their colleagues in firms with 
few interdependencies. 
  
                                                     
48 Murphy & Oyer, 2003, p. 1 
49 Based on Murphy & Oyer, 2003, p. 39, Table 8 
50 Based on Murphy & Oyer, 2003, p. 39, Table 8 
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3.1.1.2. Long-term incentives 
Objective evaluation mostly concentrates on accounting measures that reflect the effects of the agent’s 
actions on the contemporaneous firm performance. As accounting numbers are mostly analyzed at the 
end of a month, quarter, or year, they show the past effects of the agent’s actions. The consequences of 
the agent’s efforts which shape the future firm value are not taken into account. Since the agent is not 
going to invest his work in undertakings which are not rewarded by the incentive plan, he will only act 
to increase the accounting measures which he will be compensated for. This causes the agent to focus 
on ameliorating the short-term firm value reflected in the accounting measures but not considering 
long-term value creation. However, long-term value creation is the key to sustainable profits in the 
next years. Concentrating on short-term performance measures might seriously harm the long-term 
success of the firm. 
In order to set long-term incentives, compensation plans cannot merely be based on objective 
accounting measures. One approach to alleviate this problem is the use of subjective performance 
evaluations as they are capable of including long-term aspects of the agent’s work. Using discretionary 
bonuses, the employee can be rewarded for research and development which requires investments in 
the current period, decreases present accounting profit, but yields profits in the future. In fact, Chow 
and Van der Stede state that “compared to both financial and nonfinancial measures, subjective 
measures are seen as being the most effective at curtailing short-termism.”51 
In accordance with this train of thought, Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus try to draw up a 
connection between objective and subjective performance measures and their time focus. They 
hypothesize that “the use of subjectivity in the assignment of rewards will be positively related to the 
short-term focus of the quantitative measures”52. Testing the correlation between the short-term focus 
of the objective performance measure and the use of subjectivity Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and 
Vargus find that, in contrary to their hypothesis, the two variables are negatively correlated.53 They 
explain this fact by stating that the objective bonus is used to generate an intential short-term incentive 
and that this is not considered to be a weakness. 
Another consideration is empirically tested through the hypothesis that “the use of subjectivity in the 
assignment of rewards will be positively related to [..] the extent of long-term investments in 
intangibles.”54 Looking at the department’s investments in training, which is considered to be a long-
term investment in intangibles, shows that it is positively related to the use as well as the size of 
                                                     
51 Chow & Van der Stede, 2006, p. 6 
52 Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, & Vargus, 2004, p. 4 
53 Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, & Vargus, 2004 
54 Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, & Vargus, 2004, p. 4 
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subjective performance evaluations. Training expenses certainly are not the only possible long-term 
investments in intangibles but the correlation shows that the underlying theory might be valid. 
In companies where the managerial actions largely affect current performance but not future 
performance, the incentive plan can be accounting based. In firms where executive activities influence 
future performance and not current accounting performance subjective evaluation can be used to 
mitigate the focus on short-term incentives.55 In this case, stock based bonus plans can also induce 
congruent long-term incentives, but Murphy and Oyer56 argue that they are especially noisy in 
environments where managerial actions affect future performance. These substantial effects on the 
future are most likely in settings of extensive growth or investment opportunities. These theoretical 
implications are also represented by Hayes and Schaefer57 as well as by Bushman, Indjejikian, and 
Smith.58 
Murphy and Oyer try to prove their hypothesis that “bonuses will be more discretionary in companies 
with substantial growth or investment opportunities”59 by introducing proxies for investment 
opportunities. The investment opportunities were captured by the market-to-book ratio (defined as 
“average year-end stock price times the outstanding shares”60 “divided by the book value of common 
equity”61) and sales growth for the years 1993 to 1997. According to their hypothesis, both variables 
should show a positive correlation to the use of subjective performance measures, however, they do 
not. While the market-to-book ratio shows a minimal positive correlation, it is not significant. Sales 
growth shows a marginally significant negative correlation to the use of subjective performance 
measures. 
Murphy and Oyer62 offer three explanations for these findings. 
• Some firms simply use sales growth as an objective measure and do not use it in their subjective 
evaluations. 
• Other companies face investment opportunities and substantial growth and, as a consequence, 
have to deal with greater risk of failure. As discussed above, an incentive contract based on 
subjective evaluation cannot be enforced by a third party and needs to be self-enforcing through 
continuous interactions of the agent and the principal. In environments where there is a high risk 
of not continuing business, the ongoing contact between agent and principal is highly unlikely. 
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Consequentially, the contract is not self-enforcing and the agent cannot rely on receiving his 
promised compensation which leads to the fact that he is not entering the contract in the first place. 
• Firms that face growth or investment opportunities will rely on stock-based pay rather than using 
cash bonuses. 
Other authors try to find the correlation between the need for long-term incentive and the use of 
subjective performance evaluations. Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith,63 who also use the market-to-
book ratio as a measure for firm growth, find that this ratio is positively correlated to the use of 
subjective performance measures. 
Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith test the correlation of the product time horizon (reflected by product 
development cycles64 and product life cycles65) and the use of subjective evaluation. Product 
development and life cycles are classified as short or long according to the classification scheme 
published by the National Academy of Engineering.66 Cycles that last less or up to four years are 
considered to be short; all other cycles are considered to be long. 
Long development and life cycles imply that the actions taken today will not be displayed in 
accounting profits immediately. Longer cycles should compel firms to focus on long-term values and 
performance measures that capture the long-term impacts of the agent’s actions. Bushman, Indjejikian, 
and Smith’s findings show a positive correlation between the length of the product development, the 
product life cycle, and the use of individual performance measures that are subjective. Comparing 
firms with a short product development cycle to those with a long one, the percentage of the agent’s 
annual bonus based on individual performance is 8% higher in companies with a long product 
development cycle. The use of subjective performance measures is 12% higher in firms with a long 
product life cycle. 
The influence of the length of the product development cycle and the employee-to-sales ratios on the 
use of discretionary bonuses is also proven by Hayes and Schaefer.67 They concur that the principal68 
uses subjective performance evaluation to motivate the agent69 to take actions which are not reflected 
in current objective performance measures. 
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Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan also prove this effect by detecting a positive relation between their latent 
variable called STRATEGY and the occurrence of nonfinancial performance measures.70 Their 
variable STRATEGY is also derrived by employee-to-sales as well as research and development-to-
sales ratios. 
Caranikas-Walker, Goel, Gómez-Mejía, Cardy, and Rundell who test the correlation between insider-
based boards, the amount of subjectivity used in CEO assessments and the RandD intensity, also find 
that the higher the RandD expenses the more discretion is applied in the determination of bonuses.71 
3.1.2. Broad objective performance measures 
As mentioned above, objective performance evaluation is too broad when it includes aspects which are 
beyond the control of the agent. As the outcome of his actions and the performance measure used for 
determining compensation cannot be controlled by the agent, he will be demoralized and exert less 
effort. This incident can be alleviated by introducing subjectivity where the agent will not be held 
accountable for uncontrollable events. This is discussed in the next section concerning risk reduction. 
3.2. Risk reduction 
Objective formula bonuses are set exante, the remuneration is derived from the outcome which is 
observed by both, principal and agent ex-post. However, the result of the agent’s actions does not only 
depend on his effort but also on random events which accredit for the so called noise in objective 
assessments. 
These random effects can be “downside risk”72, which is hazardous for the agent since he might not be 
rewarded for his effort if the outcome is randomly low. To bear this risk, the employee demands extra 
compensation, the so called risk premium, which is costly for the principal.73 
The employer, on the other hand, wants to be protected against “good luck”74 that is, the positive 
measurement error which will give the agent a higher compensation than he deserves. 
Subjective performance evaluation can reduce both kinds of risk by filtering out uncontrollable events 
because the principal can “exploit any additional relevant information that arises during the 
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measurement period.”75 This can be achieved by making ex-post adjustments according to the 
received noise signals.76 Analytical models, such as those presented by Holmström77, as well as Baker, 
Gibbons, and Murphy,78 show that contracts based on a noisy objective measure can be enhanced by 
subjective compensation if the principal has information about noise realizations. Hayes and Schaefer 
also argue that implicit contracts that include subjectivity are used more often when quantitative 
performance measures are noisier.79 
Empirical tests such conducted by as Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus hypothesize that 
“the use of subjectivity in the assignment of rewards will be positively related to the extent to which 
the quantitative measures reflect factors outside the managers’ control.”80 Analyzing the independent 
variable “performance measure controllability”, which is defined as the “extent to which the measure 
used for the primary formula bonus reflects factors outside the manager’s control”81, Gibbs, Merchant, 
Van der Stede, and Vargus fail to find a relation between the controllablity of objective bonuses and 
the use of subjective performance measures. Their Tobit analysis, which aims at finding a correlation 
between controllability and the size of the discretionary bonus, also shows no significant results. 
However, other studies show that there is a connection between the noise of objective performance 
measures and the use of subjectivity. Woods hypothesizes that the use of subjective adjustmens to 
objective performance measures is more likely if the underlying measure is very noisy.82 His 
regression shows a significant positive correlation between the noise and the occurence of subjectivity 
(0.741, statistical significance at 1%). 
Woods tests whether using subjective adjustments to objective performance measures is influenced by 
the sensitivity of the performance measure. The larger the influence of the agent’s action on a 
performance measure, the higher the sensitivity of the measure. Therefore, the hypothesis is: “the 
likelihood of supervisors’ subjective adjustments to objective performance measures will be 
negatively related to supervisors’ perceptions of performance measure sensitivity.”83 A Probit 
regression of subjective performance adjustment shows that there is no significant correlation between 
sensitivity and the occurrence of subjectivity. An explanation for this finding is that the effects of the 
agent’s actions cannot be distinguished from uncontrollables by the less knowledgeable principal. This 
study shows no correlation but the sensitivity of performance measures also strongly depends on 
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random effects which are characterized as risk. In the section below the authors which empirically 
tested the implications of risk are discussed. 
Höppe and Moers conduct the analysis for their two cases of (1) an earnings-based contract and (2) a 
multi-measure contract.84 
1. Höppe and Moers argue that discretionary bonuses can mitigate risks and draw up the hypothesis 
that “in earnings-based contracts85, the use of discretionary bonuses is positively related to the 
noise in earnings.”86 The noise in earnings is derived from the time series variability in the 
industry return on assets, return on sales, and return on equity of the five precedent years. The 
analysis shows that the correlation between the noise in objective measures and the use of 
subjective performance evaluation is positive as expected (0.311, statistical significance at 5%). 
 
2. The first hypothesis of Höppe and Moers deals with incentive contracts that are based entirely “on 
earnings or an earnings-related measure”.87 However, subjectivity can be introduced to multi-
measure contracts, which encompass a “combination of earnings and alternative non-accounting 
measures.”88 As mentioned before, the alignment of the goals of the principal and the objectives of 
the agent calls for using a multitude of performance measures rather than just one. In order to 
achive target congruity, the measures have to be weighted to minimize distortions. If the weights 
are fixed exante, changes in the environment cannot be accounted for. If the weighting decision is 
made subjectively, which implies that it will be made ex-post, adaptive behavior will be evaluated. 
In accordance with the logic presented above, the context between the use of discretional weights 
and noise is the same as the correlation presented in Höppe and Moers’ hypothesis: “In multi-
measure contracts, the use of implicit incentive weights is positively related to environmental 
uncertainty.”89 The environmental uncertainty is measured by “the time series variability of 
monthly stock returns 60 months prior to the proxy data.”90 The analysis shows that the 
hypothesized positive correlation between environmental uncertainty and the occurrence of 
discretionary bonuses is valid (0.997, statistical significance at 5%). 
Other empirical evidence, for example Murphy and Oyer, shows that subjective performance 
evaluation is more likely to be used in cases where the inherent risk of objective performance 
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measures is higher. 91 Looking at publicly traded firms, which are believed to use stock-based pay to 
mitigate distortions from other objective performance measures (see chapter 3.1.), Murphy and Oyer 
identify (1) external and (2) internal factors for the noise in stock prices. 
1. The most important external noise factor for the stock price is systematic risk that is the risk 
inherent to conducting business. Congruent with the former findings, bonuses in publicly traded 
firms should be more discretionary in enterprises with higher systematic risk.92 However, no 
evidence was found by Murphy and Oyer93 that subjective performance evaluation is used to limit 
the risk caused by external factors such as the systematic risk. Using data from 396 firms from the 
Hewitt Associates’ compensation survey of public domestic companies for the years 1990 to 1995, 
Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith find that their proxy for noise in objective performance measures 
(in this case accounting earnings and stock price) has no significant impact on the use of 
individual performance evaluation, which is again assumed to be highly subjective. 94 
 
2. Internal noise factors are the size of the company and the number of top executives. The data 
reveals that larger firms and corporations with more managers employ significantly more 
subjective performance evaluations for top executives. This finding can be explained by the fact 
that the larger the firm is, the more actions that the agent cannot directly influence take place. This 
also holds true for an increased size of the management team because the more managers there 
are, the less influence one agent has, therefore increasing the risk that the exerted effort will go 
unrewarded. Testing private firms for an increase in discretion when the firm is larger, the 
management team includes more members and when the systematic risk is higher, shows that 
there is no significant connection. Since privately held firms cannot use stock-based bonus 
payments, the noise factors that influence the stock price are not relevant for these firms. 
Another noise proxy used for the stock price is the variance in stock price. Murphy and Oyer show 
that internal factors of the stock price such as the firm size and the size of the top management do have 
an impact on the use of subjective performance evaluation.95 External factors, however, have no 
significant influence. Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith only test for the overall variance of stock prices 
and find no connection to subjective performance evaluations.96 
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Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith also tested the influence of the noise of accounting earnings. 
However, the variance of accounting earnings proved to be non-significant for the increased use of 
individual performance evaluation.97 
3.2.1. Controllable and uncontrollable risk 
The correlation between risk and the use of subjective performance evaluation is also investigated by 
Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus.98 For their empirical test they divide risk into two 
components, the controllable and the uncontrollable. According to their definition, controllable risk 
does occur but can be adjusted for by the agent if he recognizes the development in time and is willing 
to take action. The effects of uncontrollable risk, on the other hand, cannot be altered by any action 
taken by the agent or the principal. 
For unknown reasons Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus drop the topic of uncontrollable 
risk and solely focus on the impact of controllable risk. For controllable risk, they draw up the 
following hypothesis: “Implicit rewards will be more strongly related to a performance measure the 
more important is controllable risk in the measure.”99 The assumption that the agent will be rewarded 
for reacting effectively was proven by their test results as it turned out that employees were punished 
if they did not react to controllable risk. 
The occurrence of controllable and uncontrollable risk was also investigated by Gibbs, Merchant, Van 
der Stede, and Vargus in their 2004 paper.100 They argue that the distincition between controlable and 
uncontrollabe risk is ambiguous. Often, external factors cannot be controlled by the agent, however, he 
can influence the effects of the uncontrollables by his own reactions. Therefore, taking all external risk 
off the employee would reduce the agent’s incentive to respond to new developments. 
Consequentially, uncontrollable effects should be filtered for evaluation purposes to reduce risk. 
Effects which can be changed by the employee should be included to encourage him to react to 
unforseen events. 
This reduction of risk and the ability to adapt will be more important in environments with high 
uncertainty and strong competition. As subjective performance evaluations can achieve these two 
effects, Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus hypothesize that (1) “the use of subjectivity in 
the assignment of rewards will be positively related to the level of environmental uncertainty”101 and 
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that (2) “the use of subjectivity in the assignment of rewards will be positively related to […] the level 
of competition.”102 
1. Testing for the influence of environmental uncertainty, the independent variable was captured 
through the predictability of actions of competitors, the forseeability of new car sales in the 
coming year, the stability of customer preferences, the stability of legal constraints, and the 
stability of the economic environment. The analysis for the connection to the use and the size of 
discretionary bonuses showed no significant relation whatsoever. However, this contradiction with 
the underlying theory is not further investigated or explained by Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, 
and Vargus. 
 
2. Looking at the competition in the firm’s environment, the number of competitors, the amount of 
other car dealers, and the amount of service providers is measured. The expected positive relation 
to the use and the size of subjective performance evalutions is not found as all results are 
insignificant. Despite this, Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus draw up other hypotheses 
which concern the risk of the agent that are discussed in the sections below. 
3.2.2. Difficulty to meet the target 
As argued above, subjective perfomance evaluation has the advantage that it is very flexible because it 
can be altered as the environment changes. This is most important in quickly changing business 
settings. Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus argue that when the failure of achieving a 
performance target has no negative effects for the agent, he faces no high risks. When the employee 
will be punished for not reaching his goal he faces high risks which have to be monetarily 
compensated by the principal. In order to take risk from the agent, subjectivity can be introduced in 
the evaluation process. Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus, hypothesize that “the use of 
subjectivity in the assignment of rewards will be positively related to the difficulty of meeting a 
performance target that has high consequences for failure.”103 
The difficulty to achieve the target is displayed as “100 minus the percentage likelihood that the 
performance target for the primary formula bonus will be met.”104 The consequences are defined as 
negative effects concerning the agent’s operating autonomy, pay raise, prospects for promotion, and 
continued employment. The two variables were combined to show the overall impact, which was 
positive for use (0.019, statistical significance at 5%) and for size (0.002, statistical significance at 
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5%). Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus explain that the reason for these findings is that 
firms use subjective bonuses to set aggressive targets which are flexible. Furthermore, subjective 
evalations can be an insurance if objective measures are not met. 
3.2.3. Operating in loss conditions 
Another situation where subjectivity is used to alleviate the risk for agent is the case when the whole 
entity is in a loss condition. In this setting, objective performance measures will typically be zero for 
all agents, which eliminates all motivations. If some of the risks are truly not conrollable by the agent, 
subjective performance evaluation can be used to improve incentives by filtering out these effects. 
Therefore, Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus hypothesize that „the use of subjectivity in the 
assignment of rewards will be positively related to the occurrence of a loss.”105 
Combining the data concerning the departments, which are operating at a loss and the information 
about the ocurrence of discretionary bonuses, Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus fail to find 
a connection between the two variables. Dividing the sample into service and sales departments shows 
that there is a significant increase in subjective performance evaluations (0.870, statistical significance 
at 10%) in the sales departments when the unit reports a loss. In these cases, the introduction of 
subjectivity is used to recreate incentives when the motivation stemming from objective measures is 
abolished through the loss. According to the findings of Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus 
the size of the discretionary bonus is positively related to the occurene of a loss (0.530, statistical 
significance at 20%). 
3.2.4. Risk and CEOs 
As discussed above, the use of subjective performance evaluation will depend on the quality of the 
available objective performance measures. The noisier and the riskier the objective evaluation is, the 
more likely becomes the use of subjective assessment. CEO bonuses are often stock-market based, 
which is one of the less distortionary objective measures. Noise in stock prices from internal factors is 
particularly low for the CEOs, since the decisions of the CEO have a high impact on stock prices. 
Thus, objective performance measures are of high quality. This implies that discretion will be used 
less often in CEO bonuses than in compensation contracts of other agents.106 Furthermore, subjective 
assessments are only feasible if the principal observes the work of the agent on a daily basis and has 
information about the quality of the agent’s work. Boards of directors only meet irregularly and highly 
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depend on the information given by the CEO himself; as a consequence, a profound subjective 
performance evaluation is not possible. 
Murphy and Oyer take these facts into consideration and hypothesize that the compensation plans of 
CEOs should be less discretionary. Their sample of 280 bonus plans107 shows that only 31% of the 
CEO bonus but 35% to 37% of the bonus of lower-level executives are based on subjective 
performance evaluation. The use of subjective performance evaluation is indeed less common for 
CEOs than it is for other agents. 
3.3. Limitation of manipulation 
“With manipulation the employee uses his or her specific knowledge to increase measured 
performance in ways that are not consistent with firm value.”108 Therefore, manipulating the 
performance measure will increase the utility of the agent, but not the profit of the principal. Spoofing 
of a performance measure can easily occur as the agent is better informed about the nature of his work 
and its outcome than the principal. As the supervisor is the less informed, it is hard to detect alteration 
of performance measures. 
According to Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus, “the effects of manipulation are similar to 
the effects of distortion.”109 As mentioned above, the introduction of subjective performance 
evaluation has the advantage of being able to adjust the assessment ex-post. The principal can change 
the rating if she learns that the employee did manipulate the performance measure. 
Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus hypothesize that “implicit rewards will be more strongly 
related to a performance measure; the more manipulable is the measure.”110 Testing for this hypothesis 
Gibbs et al. find out that punishments (or negative rewards) that are based on subjective evaluations 
are less likely if poor performance, based on a measure which is less prone to manipulation, occurs. If 
poor performance is recorded even though the measure is highly susceptible to manipulation, the agent 
is punished because performance must be very low if manipulating the performance measure did not 
help. 
However, Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus fail to answer their original question if 
subjective performance evaluation is more likely to occur when other measures are more manipulable. 
They only can stipulate that if poor performance is measured when the performance measure is prone 
to manipulation, negative repercussions are likely. 
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In another empirical test, Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus analyze the connection between 
manipulation of objective performance measures and the use of subjectivity. The respective hypothesis 
is: “the use of subjectivity in the assignment of rewards will be positively related to the manipulability 
of the quantitative measures.”111 
A regression shows that for the total sample of department managers there is no significant correlation 
between manipulability and the use of subjective performance measures. When the sample is divided 
into service and sales departments, it can be seen that the two variables are interrelated in the service 
departments (see Table 5). 
Table 5: Manipulability and the use of subjective performance evaluation112 
Independent variable Discretionary bonuses in all departments 
Discretionary bonuses 
in service 
departments 
Discretionary bonuses 
in sales departments 
Performance measure 
manipulation 0.035 0.397* -0.052 
 
* statistical significance at 10% 
Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus argue that the service departments include a greater 
amount of tasks which are more difficult to measure, such as quality of repairs and customer 
satisfaction. Objective performance measures in such environments are more prone to 
manipulation, while other jobs, like those in the sales departments, can be measured easily. 
Testing the correlation between the performance measure manipulation and the size of 
discretionary bonuses the data shows that there is a positive relation for the whole sample, 
which is only marginally significant (see Table 6). 
Table 6: Manipulability and the size of subjective performance evaluation113 
Independent variable Discretionary bonuses in all departments 
Discretionary bonuses 
in service 
departments 
Discretionary bonuses 
in sales departments 
Performance measure 
manipulation 0.012** 0.031* 0.008 
 
* statistical significance at 10%, ** statistical significance at 20% 
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Woods also tests the influence of manipulability, however he concentrates on subjective adjustments, 
rather than sheer subjective measures.114 In his analysis he finds that in his model the likelihood of 
subjective adjustments is not related to the manipulability of the objective performance measure.  
Woods tested a similar idea by analysing the correlation between performance measure verifiability 
and the use of subjective evaluation.115 Verifiability is “the extent to which a measure can be easily 
quantified and/or specified. ”116 When a measure can be easliy verified the bias the principal applies 
can be seen by outsiders. Therefore, Woods hypothesizes that “the likelihood of supervisors’ 
subjective adjustments to objective performance measures will be negatively related to supervisors’ 
perceptions of performance measure verifiability.”117 The regression results show that in his sample a 
negative correlation exists. 
Due to these findings, it is established that if formula-based bonuses are susceptible to manipulation, 
subjective performance evaluations can be used to mitigate distortions in some cases but not all. 
Furthermore, the less verifiable objective measure is, the more likely subjective adjustments will be 
made. 
3.4. Limited knowledge of the principal 
Another influence factor for the use of subjective performance evaluation is the limited knowledge of 
the principal and the information gathering costs which emerge, when supplemental information is 
needed. 
As Höppe and Moers put it: “the benefits of discretion hinge on the accuracy of the observed 
unverifiable signal; the lower the accuracy of this signal, the lower the benefits of using it to resolve 
contracting problems.”118 In order to observe the signal, the principal has to have knowledge on the 
nature of the agent’s job, which implies that the less knowledge the supervisor has, the more likely it is 
that performance data is falsely interpreted. However, “closely monitoring subordinates’ options and 
actions is time-consuming and intrusive. It also requires a great deal of information and, thus, an 
expensive information system.”119 
As argued above, discretionary bonuses highly depend on the fact that the principal has to be well 
informed about the actions of the agent. The CEO’s principal is the board of directors which is mostly 
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not included in the operative business of the firm on a daily basis. The composition of the board 
members plays an important role in determining whether the CEO will be evaluated subjectively or 
objectively. 
Höppe and Moers try to test this concept by dividing their sample of CEOs incentive contracts 
according to the knowledge of the principal. The boards of directors are separated into two groups, 
namely the knowledgeable and the less knowledgeable. 
The board of directors is assumed to be knowledgeable if the board includes fewer members because 
effective monitoring and finding consensus is easier in smaller groups. Busy outside directors, people 
with three or more directorships, and busy inside directors, people with two or more directorships, on 
the other hand, are thought to be less informed. 
Following Höppe and Moers distinction in (1) earning-based and (2) multi-measure contracts the 
hypotheses below are stipulated. 
1. “In an earnings-based contract, the relationship between the use of discretionary bonuses and noise 
in earnings is less positive the less knowledgeable the board.”120 The regression shows that the 
knowledge of the board itself has no implications on the use of subjectivity. Combining the effects 
of noise and information shows a negative relation (-0.325, statistical significance at 1%). This 
shows that the effects of noise on the use of discretion as less positive if the board is less 
informed. 
 
2. “In a multi-measure contract, the relationship between the use of implicit incentive weights and 
environmental uncertainty is less positive the less knowledgeable the board.”121 The findings for 
multi-measure contracts are similar to those of earning-based plans. Low knowledge of the board 
has no effects, but the combination of noise and low information proves the expected negative 
correlation to be valid (−0.321, statistical significance at 10%). 
The impact of insider-dominated boards and outsider-dominated boards on subjectivity has also been 
studied by Caranikas-Walker, Goel, Gómez-Mejía, Cardy, and Rundell. 122 Their analysis is based on 
Baysinger and Hoskisson’s paper about the composition of boards of directors123 which defines 
insider-dominated as boards in which the majority of the members is employed by the company full-
time and possesses “information regarding CEO decisions and actions due to their own intimate 
involvement in organizational decision processes, or through their personal relationships with 
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members of the top management team.”124 Therefore, insider-dominated boards should rely on 
subjective performance evaluations more heavily than outsider-based boards, which lack the necessary 
information. However, the regression for the available data does not show any significant correlations 
between board composition and the use of discretion. Caranikas-Walker, Goel, Gómez-Mejía, Cardy, 
and Rundell state that this lack of empirical proof might result from a false measure of board 
composition but an additional analysis cannot find any validation for the hypothesis. 
3.5. Influence activities 
When subjective performance evaluations are used in incentive contracts, the agent is considerably 
effected by the discretion of the supervisor. Therefore, the employee will try to influence the decision 
of the principal. These influence activities, called rent-seeking activities,125 are costly for the firm 
because the agent spends time and effort on changing the supervisor’s assessment.126 
Trying to influence the principal is a complicated business. On the one hand, the principal might 
notice the influence activities and respond by subjectively adjusting the bonus of the agent to refocus 
him. On the other hand, the influencing could go unnoticed and the manager might successfully sway 
the evaluation. 
According to Woods, prior research has shown that employees are rather successful at influencing 
their superior.127 Therefore, there should be a positive relation between the occurrence of subjective 
adjustments and the influence activities of the agent. Woods empirical analysis shows that there is a 
significant positive relation (1.164, statistical significance at 1%) indicating that the more the 
employees engage in activities to influence the supervisor’s evaluations the more the principal will use 
subjective adjustments.128 
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3.6. Personal relationships 
Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith  investigate the notion that CEO tenure, the number of years the CEO 
has been working or the principal, might have an impact on the use of subjective performance 
measures. 129 
The longer the CEO works for the board of directors the better the board is capable of assessing his 
actions. Thus, CEO tenure is assumed to be positively related to the use of individual performance 
appraisals is. A longer tenure also allows the CEO to exert more power over the board of directors, 
leading to an increase in subjective performance measures which the powerful CEO can manipulate 
more easily. On the other hand, it would be possible that a new CEO is especially evaluated 
subjectively as objective accounting measures still show the impacts of the work of his predecessor. 
An ordinary least squares regression of Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith shows that subjective 
individual performance evaluations are more likely for more seasoned CEOs.130 However, it remains 
unclear which of the presented explanations account for this effect. 
As the findings of Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith are based on a sample of CEO incentive contracts, 
it remains an open question whether the implications can be adapted to other management positions as 
well. No other paper on the use of subjective performance evaluation of the discussed authors deals 
with the tenure of the agent. Therefore, no other empirical evidence can be presented to validate the 
connection between the agent’s tenure in lower management positions and the use of subjective 
evaluation. 
4. Effects of subjective performance evaluation 
As it can be seen above, including subjective performance evaluation in bonus plans can improve 
incentives in various settings. However, the use of subjective performance measures also has its 
pitfalls. As the performance evaluation depends on the discretion of the direct supervisor, problems 
can arise. Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus state “subjectivity works well only if the 
supervisor makes fair, unbiased judgments and if the subordinate accepts the judgments and does not 
try to influence the supervisor inappropriately.”131 
                                                     
129 Bushman, Indjejikian, & Smith, 1996 
130 Bushman, Indjejikian, & Smith, 1996 
131 Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, & Vargus, 2004, p. 3 
27 
 
The most common problem noticed is rating inaccuracy, 132 which can present itself in various ways 
such as bias and favoritism.133 Other negative effects arise because of unclear measurement criteria 
and influence activities conducted by the agent. Another concern is that, due to its nature, 
discretionary bonuses cannot be verified by a third party. 
4.1. Reneging 
“Reneging occurs when contracted performance is not rewarded. Reneging is not a problem when 
performance is verifiable, because contracts can be made explicit and legally enforceable.”134 As 
subjective assessments are only observable by the principal, the bonus cannot be contractible. 
Therefore, reneging might by a problem in discretionary incentive plans. 
Theoretical thoughts on implicit contracts suggest that there is an alternative enforcement mechanism, 
namely the firm’s reputation.135 In general, an organization is aware of its perception by the market 
and reneging on compensation contracts, will make it harder for the enterprise to find future 
employees. 
Another factor influencing the probability of reneging is the reoccurrence of the employment 
relationship. When the principal and the agent will work together repeatedly, dishonest behavior will 
cause the agent to punish the supervisor for going back on her promises.136 In this case “the value of 
the future relationship must be sufficiently large that neither party wishes to renege.”137 An analytical 
proof can be seen in the paper by Gibbons.138 Reneging and turn over costs which are endured when 
the agent leaves the firm are analytically explored by Huanxing.139 
Other ways to ensure that reneging does not occur are up-or-out contracts attaching wages to jobs or 
tasks140 or by objectively determining a bonus pool and distributing it subjectively. This last 
alternative was examined by Baiman and Rajan141 as well as Ittner, Larcker, and Meyer.142 
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In most cases, the principal is not the residual claimant143 which influences the probability of reneging 
As the supervisor will not receive the compensation which is not given to the agent, she is not very 
keen on denying the agent his remuneration. 
To my knowledge no empirical studies regarding the relation between subjective performance 
evaluation and reneging exist. Nonetheless, in my belief, reneging might be a problem concerning 
discretionary assessments. 
4.2. Inaccurate performance measures 
As subjective performance evaluations are solely based on the perception of the principal, the ratings 
can be highly inaccurate. In fact, “subjective measures are seen as being most susceptible to 
measurement problems.”144 The assessment cannot be controlled by a third party. Thus, it cannot be 
established if the evaluation of the principal was correct, inaccurate or unfair. 
The assumption that inaccurate evaluation always exhibits a bad influence on compensation 
contracting, as for example presented by Rynes, Gerhart, and Parks,145 is seriously doubted by Bol146 
who also discusses positive effects of supervisor bias, which will be shown in the following chapters. 
Some imprecise evaluations can surely be attributed to the fact that, despite of trying to do the best, the 
principal is incapable of taking in all the relevant information. However, as the principal has total 
discretion when it comes to rewarding the agent, she can consider her own preferences when assessing 
an employee. This leads to biased performance ratings,147 which are more or less intended by the 
principal.148 
The amount of bias that is excerted by a principal varies according to her own needs as she intends to 
increase her utility.149 Therefore, the supervisor consideres the positive and negative consequences of 
the distorted evaluations and acts accordingly. Listed below are some of the concepts that a principal 
might consider: 
Notion 1:  “Communicating harsh but accurate ratings to employees will likely damage personal 
relationships and lead to discussions and criticism.”150 
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Notion 2: Making accurate evaluations requires a lot of information. Information gathering takes 
time and effort htat imposes costs on the principal. If information gathering costs are 
very high, it is more practicable for the supervisor not to receive the information. 
Notion 3: ”Supervisors’ compensation and promotion possibilities are often linked to employee 
performance.”151 The better the performance of the agents the better the management 
style and capabilities of the principal are thought to be. 
Notion 4: The principal herself has a supervisor who expects her to make accurate evaluations 
and might punish her if inaccurate assessments are made. 
Taking these notions into account Bol draws up the hypothesis that “the extent of bias applied to 
subjective performance ratings is influenced by the costs of communicating evaluations, information-
gathering costs, employee performance, and the attitude of the supervisor’s superiors towards rating 
accuracy.”152 
After drawing up this hypothesis, Bol focuses her analysis on two distinct supervisor biases, the 
leniency bias and the centrality bias, never coming back to answer her general hypothesis about the 
extent of bias applied to subjective evaluations. Trying to validate or falsify her statement, I sum up 
her findings concerning the occurrence of leniency and centrality bias (which are discussed in the 
following sections) to give the reader an idea whether her hypothesis is true or not. 
1. Influence of costs of communication evaluations 
In accordance with Notion 1, negative consequences of communicating harsh evaluations will cause 
the principal to bias the subjective performance evaluations to avoid distress. In general, personal 
confrontations are less costly if the engaged parties do not have strong social ties. Thus, principals will 
be less biased the shorter they have been working with the agent. Trying to find a correlation between 
the amount of time the agent has been working for the supervisor, Bol153 finds that a shorter period of 
working together implies less lenient evaluations because the principal is not afraid to communicate 
harsh accurate ratings to the employee. 
Implication: the costs of communication influence the extend of bias applied 
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2. Influence of information gathering-costs 
The negative correlation between information gathering costs and the use of subjective performance 
evaluations has been estblished. Consequentially, I argue that as the principal seeks to maximize her 
utility, high costs will be avoided even if the assessment becomes more inaccurate. In order ot make 
up for the missing information, the supervisor will rely on other factors such as general percepttions of 
the agent. This correlation is proven by Bol in her 2009 paper,154 which will be discussed below. 
Implication: the costs of information gathering influence the extend of bias applied 
3. Influence of employee performance 
Confrontations with the employee are more likely to occur when the performance of the agent is 
inadequate. Therefore, a negative influence of employee performance on rating bias is assumed.155 
Biased rating of poor performance is also used to hide departmental problems, so that the principal 
seems to be more competent in managing her department.156 However, principls are responsible for 
their departmental performance. They are assumed to be less biased when a biased rating might cause 
an agent to think that he is doing his job as expected. 
Implication: employee performance influences the extend of bias applied 
4. Influence of the attitude of the supervisor’s superiors towards rating accuracy 
Eventhough notion 4 is included in Bol’s paper,157 she fails to empirically test this idea because she 
drops it from her discussion immediately after bringing it up. In my literature review, I could not find 
any oter empirical study dealing with this problem. But it seems only logical that if the principal’s 
supervisor strongly expects the principal to make accurate evaluations and reviews the accuracy, the 
principal will be careful not to use to much intended bias to make herself look good. 
Implication: no empirical findings, logic dictates that the attitude of the supervisor’s superiors towards 
rating accuracy should influence the extend of bias applied 
Bol’s hypothesis that “the costs of communicating evaluations, information-gathering costs, employee 
performance, and the attitude of the supervisor’s superiors towards rating accuracy”158 influence the 
amount of bias applied by the princiapal seems to be true. Nevertheless, there might be other factors 
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influencing the extent to which bias is used intentionally to comply with the preferences of the 
principal. 
In the section below, destinct subcategories of bias which have been identified by the literature will be 
discussed. In particular, leniency bias, centrality bias, and favoritism could be identified so far.159 
4.2.1.1. Leniency Bias 
“Leniency bias is the tendency to provide employees with inflated subjective performance ratings.”160 
The existence of leniency bias results in evaluations which are, compared to the actual work 
performed, too high and cause higher bonuses than deserved. Leniency bias is very likely to occur as it 
was found that 60 to 70% of a firm’s agents are rated in the top two performance categories.161 
Principals often rate employees too leniently because of the reasons listed below: 
1. Human beings tend to overestimate themselves, as a consequence, they assess themselves higher 
than their principal would.162 If the principal evaluates the agent truthfully, the attained level will 
be most likely lower than the expectation of the employee. The agent, who believes that he 
received a smaller bonus than he deserves, will lower his performance to restore the feeling of 
equity.163 If the employee overestimates himself in the following period as well, the feelings of 
unfairness will get stronger, resulting in the fact that the agent works even less. In this case, 
lenient performance ratings can abolish the perceived level of unfairness and the employee will 
maintain his efforts. 
2. Receiving good performance evaluations will build the agent’s confindence in his own capabilities 
which will motivate him to undertake new projects and overcome problems in the future.164 
Testing 792 bonus plans for the occurrence of leniency bias, Bol165 divides her sample of bonus plans 
into subjective and objective components and tests whether the attained scores in subjective 
perfomance ratings are higher than in the objective performance ratings. Assuming that the objective 
performance measures are less biased and, thus, closer to the true performance and expecting that 
employees do equally well on the subjective and the objective dimension, higher scores in subjectively 
measured performance should be an indicator of the occurrence of lenient ratings. 
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The result shows that the employees’ ratings according to subjective performance measures are higher 
than their respective scores based on objective performance measures. Therefore, the occurrence of 
leniency bias is very likely because it is assumed that the actual performance is about equal in 
subjective and objective settings. 
Since Bol uses data for the years 2003 and 2004, it is astonishing that the effect of subjective 
performance evaluation is significantly positive in 2003 (+0.29) but it has a marginally negative effect 
(-0.09) on the overall rating in 2004. These findings cause Bol to conclude that “supervisors in general 
use the leeway they have in subjective performance appraisal to bias performance ratings, but that this 
does not necessarily result in more lenient ratings.”166 
Moers also hypothesizes that “subjectivity in performance measurement leads to more lenient 
performance ratings.”167 His Tobit regression shows that the subjective performance ratings are higher 
than the objective ones, which suggests that the discretionary evaluation is more lenient. 
Testing for the determinants of leniency bias, Bol defines the independent variableslisted below: 
OBJ_R  objective performance rating 
NEW_R dummy variable, 1 if the agent is working for the principal for a short amount of time 
(joined the organizations in the last three years, recently changed posistions in the 
company, or if a new principal was assigned), 0 if the agent is working for the 
principal for a long time 
INFO_C dummy variable, 0 if agent and principal have the same organizational level, 1 if the 
principal has a higher level 
GROWTH difference (in percent) between the previous and current profit of the office per year 
BUDGET difference (in percent) between the budgeted and the actual profit 
SUP_SEX supervisor sex 
SEX  agent sex 
DIF_AGE difference between principal and agent age 
SUP_AGE principal age 
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The analysis with the underlying data shows the correltation displayed in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Determinants of leniency bias168 
Independent variable Leniency bias 
OBJ_R -0.33*** 
NEW_R -0.05** 
INFO_C 0.04* 
GROWTH 0.02** 
BUDGET 0.01*** 
SUP_SEX 0.11*** 
SEX 0.3 
DIF_AGE -0.01* 
SUP_AGE -0.01* 
 
***statistical significance at 1%, ** statistical significance at 5%, * statistical significance at 10% 
 
As it can be seen in Table 7 the objective performance rating has a negative effect on the use of 
leniency bias, meaning that performance evaluations tend to be more lenient when the actual employee 
performance is weak. The amount of time the agent and the principal have been working together also 
influences the extend of leniency bias. When the relationship is fairely new, the principal rates less 
leniently as personal ties are not so strong. The costs of information gathering, which are assumed to 
be higher when the agent and the supervisor are on different organizational levels, are causing lenient 
ratings as the principal tries to avoid them. The higher the growth of the profits, the more lenient the 
ratings because supervisors can afford to be more generous when their office is performing better 
financially. This effect can also be observed with the difference between the budgeted and the actual 
profit. The better the office performance, the more lenient the principal can be. Testing for the 
influence of the principal’s sex, the regression shows that male supervisors are more lenient than their 
female counterparts. One possible explanation for this is that females are thought to be more lenient, 
as they are aware of this stereotype they excercise more caution. The sex of the agent has no influence 
on on lenient performance evaluations. The age difference, on the other hand, does have a negative 
impact on the extent of leniency bias. The larger the age gap the less lenient the rating. Bol ascribes 
this to the fact that relations between the agent and the principal are stronger when they are the same 
age. The personal relation will make it unpleasent to rate accurately when performance is weak. When 
the age difference is high, the relation is not going to be very strong and communicating harsh ratings 
is no problem, thus the principal does not have to be lenient.169 This explanation is based on the 
assumption that people of different age cannot have strong emotional ties, which can be doubted. 
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In another study, Bol examines the information gathering costs and confrontation costs for the 
principal and their effects on leniency bias. Based on the notion that the supervisor seeks to minimize 
her own cost, she will try to avoid all additional costs. Therefore, Bol hypothesizes that “information 
gathering and confrontation costs positively affect leniency bias.”170 In Bol’s empirical study ,the 
information gathering costs are approximated by dividing the principals in two groups: The one group 
that shares its workspace with its agents and works together with them most of the time is thought to 
incur low information costs. The other group that is not as familiar with its agents’ actions is assumed 
to incur high information gathering costs. The confrontation costs are captured through the personal 
relationship between agent and principal. The relation is captured through age difference, gender 
difference, and the amount of time the employee has been working for the supervisor.  The analysis of 
incentive plans for non-management employees shows that the higher the information gathering and 
the confrontation costs the more leniently the principal will rate. 
So far it has been established that leniency bias does exist under certain circumstances and that there 
are various variables which influence the amount of leniency employed. Above, it has been stated that 
Bol assumes that evaluation bias does not only affect performance in a negative way. Thus, the section 
below deals with the effects of leniency bias on performance. 
As performance evaluation is a mean to show agents how well they perform their tasks, lenient ratings 
make employees believe that their actions are desired by the supervisor. Consequentially, wrong or 
undesired behaviour will still be conducted because the agent is lead to believe that he is doing a good 
job. Bol argues that “supervisors are expected to be cautious about stimulating undesirable actions“171 
and concludes that the overall effect of the leniency bias is positive as it increases the agent’s effort. 
This results in the hypothesis “leniency bias has a positive effect on the effectiveness of a 
compensation contract as an incentive provider.”172 
As Bol173 used data for the years 2003 and 2004, she tries to capture the effects of supervisor bias by 
comparing the performance in the two years, matching it with the amount of bias which was exercised 
in the first year. 
In order to better capture the effects on performance the dependent variables are divided in 
ΔPERF_O difference between the objective rating of 2003 and 2004, 
ΔPERF_S difference between the subjective rating of 2003 and 2004, 
ΔPERF_T difference between the total rating of 2003 and 2004, and 
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EFFORT change in the agent’s effort according to the employees self-assessment on a 5-item 
Likert scale.174 
The independent variable refering to the use of subjective performance evaluations is175 
LEN_BIAS “Leniency bias, measured as the residuals of the regression of the ratio between the 
subjective performance rating and the objective performance rating on the contractual 
weights, the number of performance measures and the centrality bias”176 
Table 8: Performance effects of leniency bias177 
 ΔPERF_O ΔPERF_S ΔPERF_T EFFORT 
LEN_BIAS 0.73*** -0.10 0.22* 0.39* 
 
*** statistical significance at 1%, * statistical significance at 10% 
 
The analysis shows that the occurence of leniency bias has negative as well as positive effects. After 
the occurence of lenient ratings, the objective performance evaluations increased in the following year. 
The total rating including objective and subjective ratings augmented too. The subjective rating in the 
sequential year is not singnificantly altered by rating leniently. The excerted effort has increased. Due 
to these findings, it can be said that even though leniency bias distorts evaluations, it has positive 
performance effects. 
4.2.1.2. Centrality bias 
“Centrality bias is the tendency to compress performance ratings, creating less variance in 
performance ratings than in actual performance.”178 Centrality bias causes the performance ratings to 
cluster aroung the middle of the possible range, not allowing deviation from the average. The 
appearance of compression is thought to be due to insufficient differenciation between the agents 
because the needed information is not easliy available to the principal. 
Moers hypothesizes that “subjectivity in performance measurement leads to more compressed 
performance ratings”179 Moers analysis of incentive plans for 160 higher-level subordinates shows that 
“on average, the performance ratings on the subjective dimension are closer to the median rating than 
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the performance ratings on the objective dimension.”180 The findings show that the subjective 
performance ratings are indeed more compressed than their objective counterparts. 
The determinants of centrality bias have been empirically tested by Bol.181 To capture centrality bias 
she measured “the ratio between the standard deviation of all ratings on the objective dimension and 
the standard deviation of all ratings on the subjective dimension for each reference group.”182 Based on 
this definition, a high ratio indicates that compared to the objective evaluation the subjective rating is 
subject to centrality bias and, thus, compressed. 
The correltations of the empirical analysis are presentend in the table below. The independent 
variables have already been explained in the previous section. 
Table 9: Determinants of centrality bias183 
Independent variable Centrality bias 
OBJ_R 0.19 
NEW_R 0.64* 
INFO_C 0.48* 
GROWTH -0.02** 
BUDGET -0.04 
SUP_SEX -0.08 
SEX - 
DIF_AGE - 
SUP_AGE 0.02 
 
**statistical signifiance at 5%, * statistical significance at 10% 
As it can be seen above, centrality bias is not influenced by the objective ratings. The amount of time 
the agent and the principal have been working together affects the extend of compression. Bol argues 
that she expects relations to be weak at the beginning, therefore, the principal is not afraid to 
differentiate between employees.184 However, the empirical data shows that ratings are more 
compressed at the beginning of the employer-agent relationship. This could be due to the fact that the 
principal is not willing to differentiate strongly until she has more information about the agent’s actual 
performance. Similar to the effect on leniency bias, the principal excerts more centrality bias when 
information gathering costs are high. The independent variable GROWTH shows that supervisors 
compress less when the profit growth is larger. All other variables do not to influence the centrality 
bias significantly. 
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In another study, Bol hypothizes that “information gathering and confrontation costs positively affect 
centrality bias.”185 Using the same variables as above, Bol’s analysis shows hat the hypothesis is valid 
and compression is more likely the higher the costs. 
Now that the determinants of centrality bias have been discussed, I will focus on the effects of 
compressed ratings. The effects of centrality bias have to be examined according to the two possible 
groups of agents, namely (1) the above-average performers and (2) the below-average performers. 
1. Above-average employees will receive an average rating even though their efforts were high. They 
will be demotivated to see that they did not reach their expected level of performance. They see 
that co-workers who performed worse are equally rewarded. In the future, above-average 
performers will decrease their efforts because they believe that they are not rewarded for their 
work on a fair basis. Bol hypothesizes that “centrality bias has a negative effect on the 
effectiveness of a compensation contract as an incentive provider for above-average 
performers.”186 
2. Below-average employees, on the other hand, are influenced in a positive way. Due to the 
compression of the ratings, their performance is rated better than it actually is. Since human beings 
tend to overestimate themselves, they think that they deserve the higher evaluation. The 
compression of the evaluation scale protects them from being disappointed and supresses the 
likelihood of lower performance because of perceived unfairness. However, below-average 
performers will not try to increase their productivity because an improvement of effort will not 
lead to a better performance assessment. Since compression has a positive and a negative effect it 
cannot be hypothesized which overall effect the centrality bias has.187 
The dependent variables are the same as explained in section 4.2.1.1. The independent variables 
refering to the use of subjective performance evaluations, in particular centrality bias, are:188 
CEN_BIASA centrality bias refering to an above-average performer 
CEN_BIASB centrality bias refering to a below-average performer 
  
                                                     
185 Bol, 2007, p. 7 
186 Bol, 2007, p. 9 
187 Bol, 2007 
188 Other variables such as the employee’s potential to growth, the change of supervisor, and the change of the 
incentive system are examined in Bol’s study as well. As these variables are not especially related to 
subjective performance evaluations there impact will not be discussed here. 
38 
Table 10: Performance effects of centrality bias189 
 ΔPERF_O ΔPERF_S ΔPERF_T EFFORT 
CEN_BIASA -0.14*** -0.04 -0.08** -0.27t 
CEN_BIASB -0.13*** -0.06*** -0.09*** -0.72** 
 
*** statistical significance at 1%, ** statistical significance at 5%, t statistical significance at 15% 
 
Bol’s empirical test shows that centrality bias has a negative effect on all performance levels for above 
and below average performers and, therefore, should be avoided. 
4.2.1.3. Favoritism 
Another important factor which plays a role when the agent’s performance is evaluated subjectively is 
favoritism. Since the assessment solely results from the supervisor’s perception, she might rate 
employees based on personal preference190 to encourage loyalty, promote personal agendas, or punish 
rebellious employees.191 
The occurrence of favoritism is partly due to the hierarchical structure in firms. The supervisor who 
evaluates the agent has another principal. Therefore, the supervisor herself is not the so called residual 
claimant of the managers output.192 In the beginning of the paper it was argued that the principal 
receives the outcome of the agent’s work and in return offers the employee some kind of 
remuneration. The profit of the supervisor should therefore be the output minus the compensation for 
the agent. This is not the case in most employer-supervisor relationships as the principal is not the 
owner of the company and has a pay plan which is independent of the agent’ remuneration. In these 
cases, the principal’s incentives regarding the evaluation of their subordinates are not perfectly aligned 
with organizational objectives,193 which will lead to inefficient and ineffective compensation 
contracting.194 In fact, there are a lot of noted complaints of perceived favoritism195 but little evidence 
to prove the existence of favoritism.196 
However, Woods hypothesizes that “the likelihood of supervisors’ subjective adjustments to objective 
performance measures will be positively related to perceptions of supervisor favoritism.”197 His 
analysis shows that there is a positive correlation (0.602, statistical significance at 1%), noting that the 
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supervisors which are thought to apply favoritism use subjective adjustment to objective performance 
measures more often. This also implies that the use of subjectivity is triggered by favoritism and 
enlarges the effects of favoritism, which are additional costs of subjective performance evaluation. 
4.3. The importance of trust 
As it can be seen above, the introduction of subjectivity can ameliorate incentive contracts by 
mitigating distortions and reducing risks for employees. Nevertheless, negative effects and 
implementation problems are caused either by the volition of the principal or the agent because they 
want to influence the incentive contract in one way or another. Therefore, the impact of subjective 
performance evaluations on the agent’s performance and his satisfaction with the actual bonus cannot 
be theoretically derived.198 
Based on the knowledge that the agent’s satisfaction with his assessment is higher when he trusts his 
supervisor199 and that incentive plans are more effective when the principal and the agent trust each 
other,200 Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus conclude that subjectivity in combination with 
trust should improve performance and increase the agent’s contentment with the incentive system. 
From this train of thought three hypothesis are developed: 
“The use of subjectivity in assigning rewards will be more positively related to pay satisfaction […] 
the greater the level of trust.”201 
“The use of subjectivity in assigning rewards will be more positively related to […] productivity […] 
the greater the level of trust.”202 
“The use of subjectivity in assigning rewards will be more positively related to […] net profit […] the 
greater the level of trust.”203 
Testing for the effects of subjective evaluations in combination with trust on pay satisfaction, Gibbs, 
Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus find that this connection is significantly positive (1.257, 
statistical significance at 5%). Thus, they conclude that trust is an important factor for the successful 
use of discretionary bonuses. 
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The positive correlation between trust combined subjective performance measures and productivity is 
even stronger (23.351, statistical significance at 5%). The same holds true for the influence on net 
profit (72.363, statistical significance at 5%). 
These findings indicate that subjective bonuses have a more positive effect when the principal and the 
agent trust each other. Therefore, relational contracting and trust is essential when subjective 
incentives are implemented. 
5. Discussion 
Gathering the relevant papers for this literature review, it became obvious that several authors have 
already empirically tested the application and the implications of subjective performance evaluation. 
The underlying theoretical concepts used for the studies are based on the principal-agent theory. 
Therefore, the theoretical background is the same for the studies presented in this paper. As all authors 
rely on the same theories, the hypothesized correlations are coherent. This general agreement on the 
theoretical concepts of subjective performance evaluations is astonishing, because not one single paper 
argues that the theory might be flawed. 
Despite the common grounds, each paper deals with explicit research questions specified by the 
authors. As a consequence, the models differ from author to author and the hypotheses concentrate on 
specific aspects on the use or the effects of subjective performance evaluations. Some papers have 
similar research questions so that there were multiple findings regarding the same topic. Other authors 
concentrated on very specific matters so that the findings could not be compared to any other 
empirical results. 
5.1. Comparability of studies 
Even for the relations that are tested multiple times, the comparison is not easy, as the underlying 
models differ. Furthermore, the samples are diverse. The data was collected by various primary 
surveys or deduced from secondary datasets which already existed. All surveys were constructed for 
different target groups. Some were for CEOs204 while others were aimed at incentive contracts for 
managers.205 Even if it can be argued that the theory should be largely valid for both kinds of agents, it 
was never proven that the results for one group are valid for the other one as well. Since the 
underlying theories are the same and the hypotheses are derived from the same basic knowledge, I 
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expect the results to be comparable. Thus, I chose to present empirical studies for compensation plans 
for CEOs as well as for other managers. 
Most of the studies included questions which were answered by using the perception of the agent or 
the principal. To capture the impression, a 5-point Likert scale was utilized. The reasons and effects of 
discretionary assessments were captured through questionnaires with subjective answers. Therefore, 
the data is prone to the same distortions which were discussed in the chapter about effects of 
subjective performance evaluations. However, the surveys could not be constructed differently to 
obtain the requested information. The reader needs to keep in mind that the answers are susceptible to 
distortions. 
Furthermore, the samples include data from different geographical regions. As most of them206 were 
gathered in the United States of America it can be assumed that the underlying socioeconomic 
understandings are the same for the entire datasets. 
The studies were conducted in different years; the data spans from 1996/1997 in the paper by Murphy 
and Oyer207 to 2006.208 Covering a decade, the data, the incentive contracts, the principals, and the 
agents have surely changed. 
Another aspect to keep in mind is that there is no generally valid definition for subjective performance 
evaluation. Almost all authors even fail to give a definition of subjectivity in their papers. In the 
course of reading, it turns out that some scientists think of subjective performance evaluation as the 
sheer occurrence of any discretionary assessment while others concentrate on subjective adjustments 
to objective measures. This makes it additionally hard to compare the findings as it cannot be assured 
that neither the hypotheses nor the questionnaires were covering the same phenomenon. For future 
research I would strongly suggest to draw up a common definition which can be used for all 
subsequent studies so that the comparability of hypotheses and results is ensured. 
The differences in the various studies make it clear why some of them find contradicting empirical 
evidence. Despite these caveats, some coherent findings which give implications for the validity of 
some of the theoretical hypotheses could be found. 
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5.2. Coherent findings 
Looking at different studies from various authors the following hypotheses, which were tested more 
than once, show coinciding results. 
1. Overall occurrence of subjective performance 
The empirical findings on the overall occurrence of subjective performance evaluation show that 
the agents who are receiving a discretionary bonus make up about one fourth of the sample (23% 
of managers209, 25% of middle managers210 and 35%211 CEOs). 
2. Interdependencies 
Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus find that there is a positive relation between and the 
use of subjective assessments.212 Murphy and Oyer find the same correlation.213 The hypothesis 
that interdependencies positively influence the use of subjectivity is validated. 
1. Subjective performance evaluation and leniency bias 
Concerning the effects of subjective performance evaluation, both, Bol214 and Moers215 find that 
subjective ratings are in fact more lenient than objective ones. 
2. Subjective performance evaluation and centrality bias 
Both, Bol216 and Moers217 test the notion that subjective assessments are more compressed than 
their objective counterparts. Their studies indeed show that subjective ratings deviate less than 
objective ones. 
These hypotheses are the only ones which were tested more than once and received coherent results. 
All others were either only tested by one author or contradicting findings were obtained. 
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5.3. Contradicting findings 
1. Completeness of objective performance measures 
Murphy and Oyer’s empirical results show that subjective performance evaluation is used more 
often when objective assessments are less complete.218 Testing their entire sample for the impact 
of formula-based contract completeness, Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus find no 
significant correlation.219 When their sample is divided into service and sales departments, the 
results change. In the service departments, a significant relation of the completion of objective 
measures and the use of subjective performance evaluation can be seen. This is explained by the 
fact that jobs in the service departments depend on factors which can hardly be assessed by 
objective measures. Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus also test for the influence of 
formula-based contract completeness on the size of the subjective bonus and find no correlation, 
even when the sample is further divided. Woods analysis shows that subjective adjustments to 
objective performance measures are more likely to occur when objective assessments are 
incomplete.220 
The results show that in most studies there is a correlation between the completeness of objective 
performance measures and the use of subjective performance evaluations. Only the study of 
Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus finds no valid relation in parts of their sample. They 
explain this by saying that in parts of their sample formula-based bonuses are almost complete so 
that subjective performance evaluation is not needed. 
2. Long-term incentives 
Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus test the correlation between the short-term focus of 
formula-based evaluations and the use of subjective performance assessments and do not find the 
hypothesized relation.221 Murphy and Oyer also analyze this relation and do not find an empirical 
proof either.222 Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith, on the other hand, do find that their proxies for 
long-term focus are correlated to the use of subjectivity.223 Hayes and Schaefer224, Ittner, Larcker, 
and Rajan225, as well as Caranikas-Walker, Goel, Gómez-Mejía, Cardy, and Rundell226 also 
validate the hypothesis that subjective performance evaluation is used to induce long-term 
incentives. These studies use different variables to capture the long-term focus, which explain the 
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deviating results. However, four out of six studies do find a realtion between long-term incentives 
and the use of subjective performance evaluation. Therefore, the underlying hypothesis should be 
valid to some extend. 
3. Risk reduction 
Theoretically, subjective performance evaluation can be used to reduce the risk of objective bonus 
plans. The variables for risk, which are measures in empirical studies, vary from analysis to 
analysis so that the deviating findings are no surprise. The variables which were used and their 
correlation to the occurrence of subjective assessments are shown in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Variables for risk and their correlation 
Independent variable 
Correlation to subjective 
performance evaluation 
Authors 
Performance measure 
controllability No 
Gibbs, Merchand, Van der 
Stede, and Vargus227 
Noise Yes Höppe and Moers228 
Noise Yes Woods229 
Sensitivity of objective 
performance measures No Woods
230 
Noise Yes Höppe and Moers231 
Environmental uncertainty Yes Höppe and Moers232 
Environmental uncertainty No Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus233 
External risk No Murphy and Oyer234 
External risk No Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith235 
Internal Risk No Murphy and Oyer236 
Variance in stock price 
(internal factors) Yes Murphy and Oyer
237 
Variance in stock price 
(external factors) Yes Murphy and Oyer
238 
Variance in stock price 
(overall) No 
Bushman, Indjejikian, and 
Smith239 
Variance in accounting 
earnings No 
Bushman, Indjejikian, and 
Smith240 
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Controllable risk Yes Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus241 
Competition No Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus242 
Difficulty of meeting the 
performance target and 
negative effects 
Yes Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus243 
Operating in loss condition Yes244 Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus245 
 
As shown in Table 11, the connection between the variables which are used to approximate risk in 
objective performance measure and the use of subjective performance evaluation are ambiguous. 
One explanation for the different results are the definitions of risk and the ways in which it is 
measured. The study of Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus shows that the hypothesis is 
not valid for the entire sample while it holds true for certain subgroups.246 Therefore, it can be said 
that the sample group does play am important role. As all studies use different data from different 
industries and years, the comparison is not easy. The studies show that out of eighteen hypotheses, 
nine were validated. 
4. Limitation of manipulation 
According to the theory, subjective performance evaluation should be used when objective 
measures are easily manipulable. Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus test this correlation 
and find that in their entire sample it is not significant.247 When the sample is divided into sales 
and service departments, there is a relation in the service departments. Again, it is argued that 
tasks in the sales department can be assessed easily and, therefore, there subjective evaluation is 
needed. Testing for the size of subjecteive bonuses, the whole sample shows a positive correlation. 
Woods, on the other hand, finds that the occurcenc of subjective adjustments is not related to the 
manipulability of objective measures.248 These findings indicate that subjectivity can be used to 
mitigate manipulation in some cases. 
5. Limited knowledge of the principal 
Höppe and Moers find that limited knowledge itself has no impact on the use of subjective 
performance measures but that in combination with noise, it is a significant determinant.249 
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Caranikas-Walker, Goel, Gómez-Mejía, Cardy, and Rundell250 also find no correlation between 
knowledge and subjectivity. Both studies approximate the amount of knowledge by board 
composition. The definitions of knowledgeable and not knowledgeable are defined by full-time 
employment and the amount of directorships. These measures might not be the best way to capture 
the information the principal has at hand. Other variables like the amount of time the principal and 
the agent spend together might be a better approximation, which still needs to be tested. 
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6. Conclusion 
My literature review on empirical studies in the field of subjective performance evaluation shows that 
discretionary assessments are commonly used to award CEOs and managers of all levels. The authors 
agree on the fact that the occurrence of subjective performance evaluation is widely spread and lies at 
about one quarter of all tested agents. 
Various studies which are based on the same theoretical background were looked at in order to find 
common empirical results. Hypotheses which are validated by multiple studies are rare. Concerning 
the use of subjective performance evaluation, the only hypothesis which was validated by two studies 
was the correlation between interdependencies and the use of subjectivity. 
All other influence factors received contradictory findings even though the hypotheses are largely the 
same. This is due to the fact that the studies are conducted in different years, use dissimilar samples, 
and measure slightly different variables. The absolute falsification of a hypothesis has never been 
proven because the authors can always explain the deviating findings. In the majority of all 
hypotheses, some studies also validate the underlying idea. 
The effects of subjective performance evaluation, namely leniency bias, centrality bias, and favoritism, 
have not been studied as much as the determinants of its use. Empirical tests show that subjective 
assessments tend to be more lenient and more compressed than their objective counterparts, which has 
been validated by two independent authors. All other determinants of bias and their effects on future 
behavior have only been tested by one author so far. In this field, there is a serious need for more 
empirical studies to test the theoretical considerations. 
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7. Extended bibliography 
In the following chapters my main sources are discussed. To make comparisons easier, each paper is 
displayed in the sections goal, definition of subjective performance evaluation, sample, as well as 
hypotheses and findings. 
7.1. Bol, 2007 
Goal 
Bol’s paper “The determinants and performance effects of supervisor bias“251 concentrates on 
leniency and centrality bias and examines their determinants and effects. Bol published 
another paper with the exact same title in 2009.252 The 2009 paper uses the same sample, the 
same models and is almost identical with the one from 2007. The only difference is that 
hypothesis 1 is more detailed in the 2009 paper. 
Definition of subjective performance evaluation 
Though Bol focuses on leniency and centrality bias in subjective performance evaluation, she does not 
define what discretionary assessments are. Throughout the paper, the reader finds hints that Bol refers 
to the general idea of subjective performance evaluation as described in Chapter 2. 
Sample 
The sample consists of incentive plans for low-level employees of five branch offices of a financial 
service provider. Contracts which included objective and subjective elements and the performance 
data for the years 2004 and 2005 are used. 
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Hypotheses and findings 
Table 12: Bol hypotheses and findings 
Hypothesis Validation 
“The extent of bias applied to subjective 
performance ratings is influenced by the costs of 
communicating evaluations, information-
gathering costs, employee performance, and the 
attitude of the supervisor’s superiors towards 
rating accuracy.“253 
N/A 
“Leniency bias has a positive effect on the 
effectiveness of a compensation contract as an 
incentive provider.”254 
True 
“Centrality bias has a negative effect on the 
effectiveness of a compensation 
contract as an incentive provider for above-
average performers.”255 
True 
7.2. Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus, 2004 
Goal 
The paper “Determinants and effects of subjectivity in incentives”256 by Gibbs, Merchant, Van der 
Stede, and Vargus aims to answer two questions. Firstly, under which circumstances do firms use 
subjective performance evaluations? Secondly, what are the effects of discrection on actual employee 
performance and the agent’s satisfaction with his pay? 
Definition of subjective performance evaluation 
While the authors distinguish between different ways in which subjectivity can occur, Gibbs, 
Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus do not offer a definition for subjective performance evaluation. 
Only the comments to their Tabe 1 show that a “discretionary bonus is based on the supervisor’s 
subjective judgment of the manager’s performance.”257 However, this is the only definition which can 
be found because the examples of their questionnaire also do not include any hints what subjective 
performance assessments are exactly. 
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Sample 
The study uses data from compensation contracts in auto dealerships in the United States used in 1998. 
The incentive plans of department managers were investigated as they are not as complex as bonus 
plans for senior executives. A customized survey was conducted with the help of a management-
consulting firm. Each dealership received five questionnaires, one for the owner, one for the general 
manager, one for the service department manager, one for the new car sales department manager, and 
one for the used car sales department managers. In total, 1.050 usable surveys were returned (274 from 
owners, 250 from general managers, 205 from service department managers, 185 from new cars 
department managers, and 136 from used car sales managers). 
Hypotheses and findings 
Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus argue that the influence of a discretionary bonus depends 
on both, its incidence and its size. Therefore, they conduct a Logit analysis to find the determinants of 
incindence and a Tobit analysis to establish the factors influencing the size of the subjective bonuses. 
Due to the two analyses, each hypothesis has two empirical findings. 
Table 13: Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus hypotheses and findings 
Hypothesis Validation for use Validation for size 
“The use of subjectivity in the assignment of 
rewards will be negatively related to formula 
bonus completeness.”258 
True* True 
“The use of subjectivity in the assignment of 
rewards will be positively related to the 
short-term focus of the quantitative 
measures.”259 
False False 
“The use of subjectivity in the assignment of 
rewards will be positively related to […] the 
extent of long-term investments in 
intangibles.”260 
True True 
“The use of subjectivity in the assignment of 
rewards will be positively related to the 
manipulability of the quantitative 
measures.”261 
True* True 
“The use of subjectivity in the assignment of 
rewards will be positively related to the 
extent to which the quantitative measures 
False False 
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reflect factors outside the managers’ 
control.”262 
“The use of subjectivity in the assignment of 
rewards will be positively related to the 
extent of organizational 
interdependencies.”263 
True False 
“The use of subjectivity in the assignment of 
rewards will be positively related to the level 
of environmental uncertainty.”264 
False False 
“The use of subjectivity in the assignment of 
rewards will be positively related to […] the 
level of competition.”265 
False False 
“The use of subjectivity in the assignment of 
rewards will be positively related to the 
difficulty of meeting a performance target 
that has high consequences for failure.”266 
True True 
“The use of subjectivity in the assignment of 
rewards will be positively related to the 
occurrence of a loss.”267 
True* True 
“The use of subjectivity in assigning rewards 
will be more positively related to pay 
satisfaction […] the greater the level of 
trust.”268 
True Not tested 
“The use of subjectivity in assigning rewards 
will be more positively related to […] 
productivity […] the greater the level of 
trust.”269 
True Not tested 
“The use of subjectivity in assigning rewards 
will be more positively related to […] net 
profit the greater the level of trust.”270 
True Not tested 
 
* Under certain circumstances as explained above 
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7.3. Höppe and Moers, 2007 
Goal 
The paper “Discretion and the complexity of simple incentive contracts”271 by Höppe and Moers aims 
to examine the determinants of discretion in CEO incentive contracts. They try to find out what the 
motivations to use subjective performance evaluation are and how the implicit contracts change with 
the type of implicitness, the contract details, and the underlying contracting problems. 
Definition of subjective performance evaluation 
Höppe and Moers state that there are different examples of subjective performance evaluations. They 
distinguish between subjectively assessing qualitative aspects of the agent’s tasks and the possibility 
of ex-post assigning subjective weights to multiple performance measures. 
Sample 
Höppe and Moers use data of incentive contracts from Security and Exchange Commission proxy 
statements for the years 1998 to 2002. The proxy statements provide information about the annual 
bonus plans and whether these plans are formula-based or discretionary. The sample only comprises 
publicly listed entities which are included in EXECUCOMP272 and where the CEO did not change 
from 1998 to 2002. In total, the empirical analysis contains 1,753 incentive plans for 424 firms. 
Hypotheses and findings 
The authors conduct the analysis for the cases of an earnings-based contract and a multi-measure 
contract. 
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Table 14: Höppe and Moers hypotheses and findings 
Hypothesis Validation 
“In earnings-based contracts, the use of 
discretionary bonuses is positively related 
to the noise in earnings.”273 
True 
“In multi-measure contracts, the use of implicit 
incentive weights is positively related to 
environmental uncertainty.”274 
True 
“In an earnings-based contract, the relationship 
between the use of discretionary bonuses and 
noise in earnings is less positive the less 
knowledgeable the board.”275 
True 
“In a multi-measure contract, the relationship 
between the use of implicit incentive weights and 
environmental uncertainty is less positive the less 
knowledgeable the board.”276 
True 
7.4. Murphy and Oyer, 2003  
Goal 
Murphy and Oyer’s paper “Discretion in executive incentive contracts” aims at studying the function 
of discretion in incentive contracts designed for executive personnel. 
Definition of subjective performance evaluation 
According to Murphy and Oyer, discretion is defined as the ratio of subjective and objective 
performance measures. Thus, bonuses are more discretionary when “the relative weight on subjective 
vs. objective performance measures will be higher.”277 
Sample 
The data for the empirical test was gathered through a confidential survey named “Annual Incentive 
Plan” conducted by the consulting firm Towers Perrin in 1996 and 1997. 262 public and private firms 
from all sectors of the economy took part in the survey and revealed data about annual bonus plans 
which were effective between 1993 and 1995. The incentive plans, which were used for CEOs and 
other top executives, included up to 25.000 participants. Not all data from the survey was used for all 
parts of the empirical analysis due to incomplete information or insufficient details. 
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Hypotheses and findings 
Table 15: Murphy and Oyer hypotheses and findings 
Hypothesis Validation 
“Bonuses will be more discretionary (that is, the 
relative weight on subjective vs. objective 
performance measures will be higher) in 
privately held companies than in publicly held 
corporations.”278 
True 
“Bonuses in publicly traded firms will be more 
discretionary in larger companies and in 
companies with more top executives.”279 
True 
“Bonuses in publicly traded firms will be more 
discretionary in companies with higher 
systematic risk.”280 
False 
“Bonuses will be more discretionary in 
companies with substantial growth or investment 
opportunities.”281 
False 
“Bonuses will be less discretionary for the CEO 
than for lower-level executives.”282 True 
“Bonuses will be less discretionary, and more 
based on business-unit rather than 
company-wide results, in relatively autonomous 
business units.”283 
True 
7.5. Woods, 2008 
Goal 
Woods’ paper “Subjective adjustments to objective performance measures: an empirical examination 
of the economic benefits and social costs in complex work settings”284 seeks to answer the question 
whether principals adjust objective performance measures by exercising subjectivity. 
Definition of subjective performance evaluation 
Woods study concentrates on the possibility of subjective adjustments. He stipulates that there is an 
original performance measure which is objective, but due to deficiencies the principal decides to adjust 
the underlying objective incentive plan. Woods also lacks an explanation as to what subjective 
actually means. It just is clear that the supervisor can decide about the adjustment according to her 
own discretion. 
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Sample 
Woods uses a combination of proprietary secondary data and results from a survey conducted by him. 
The secondary data stems from a pay-for-performance compensation plan which is used by a large 
internal audit organization. The survey data measures perceptions about objective performance 
measures and the adjustments made by supervisors. The total dataset includes 111 audit managers and 
their incentive contracts in 2006. 
Hypotheses and findings 
Table 16: Woods hypotheses and findings 
Hypothesis Validation 
“The likelihood of supervisors’ subjective 
adjustments to objective performance measures 
will be negatively related to supervisors’ 
perceptions of performance measure 
sensitivity.”285 
False 
“The likelihood of supervisors’ subjective 
adjustments to objective performance measures 
will be negatively related to supervisors’ 
perceptions of performance measure 
congruity.”286 
False 
“The likelihood of supervisors’ subjective 
adjustments to objective performance measures 
will be negatively (positively) related to 
supervisors’ perceptions of performance measure 
precision (noise).”287 
True 
“The likelihood of supervisors’ subjective 
adjustments to objective performance measures 
will be negatively related to supervisors’ 
perceptions of performance measure 
completeness.”288 
True 
“The likelihood of supervisors’ subjective 
adjustments to objective performance measures 
will be negatively related to supervisors’ 
perceptions of performance measure 
verifiability.”289 
True 
“The likelihood of supervisors’ subjective 
adjustments to performance measures will be 
positively related to supervisors’ perceptions of 
performance measure manipulability.”290 
False 
“The likelihood of supervisors’ subjective 
adjustments to objective performance measures True 
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will be positively related to perceptions of 
manager influence activities.”291 
“The likelihood of supervisors’ subjective 
adjustments to objective performance measures 
will be positively related to perceptions of 
supervisor favoritism.”292 
True 
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